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 Abstract  
Financial reforms have been found to be highly important in promoting aggregate productivity. 
Yet, the linkage between access to finance, firm-level productivity, and exporting performance 
has been overlooked in the literature. We fill this gap using a rich dataset of 11,612 Indian 
firms over the period 1988-2014 to study the impact of a unique financial policy intervention 
on firm performance. We document a significant effect of capital-account liberalization 
through the lens of an export-oriented policy initiative on firms’ productivity and consequently 
on their exporting activity. Finally, the beneficial effect of the policy change is more 
pronounced for financially vulnerable firms, as measured by high debt dependence and low 
levels of liquidity. 
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1. Introduction  
It is well accepted that due to limited capital flows, lack of access to external financing became 
a major constraint for firms in emerging markets during the 1990s, hampering aggregate 
growth and acceleration of their exporting activities. Many governments in the developing 
world have liberalized their capital-account regulations, especially regarding restrictions on 
external borrowing, in order to enable better access to financing. Yet, although widespread, 
researchers rarely evaluate these programs using firm-level data, especially for developing 
economies. In this paper, we rely on a rich dataset and a unique financial policy intervention 
to fill this gap.  
We use panel data for 11,612 Indian firms between 1988 and 2014 to analyze the firm-level 
response to the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), which the Indian government 
enacted in 1999 (it became effectively operational starting in 2000). Our empirical strategy 
analyses how well FEMA helps firms to access funds from abroad and achieve better 
performance during the post-2000 reform period. We thus aim to provide new evidence on how 
firm performance, in terms of productivity improvement, responds to international transaction 
liberalization with implications for the intensive margin of trade activity. In addition, we argue 
that although FEMA beneficiaries enjoy an improvement in their performance, the effect may 
be heterogeneous across firms. More specifically, we investigate how firms’ productivity reacts 
to FEMA reform, and whether high-leverage firms and those with lower liquidity are more 
likely to benefit from the FEMA reform.     
To answer these questions, we carry out a difference-in-differences analysis to estimate 
how the policy shift affects firm productivity and ultimately export intensity. Our dataset spans 
a pre-policy period (1988-1999) and a post-policy period (2000-2014). We identify two groups 
of firms: treated and control. The former group includes exporting firms with foreign financing 
under the external commercial borrowing (ECB) framework, which was introduced after the 
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FEMA reform. The latter group includes exporting firms with domestic financing only. The 
identifying assumption for the research design is that treated and control firms behave similarly 
in the absence of the policy change.  
India provides an ideal laboratory for the empirical analysis for two main reasons. First, 
India is the fifth largest economy as per nominal GDP according to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). However, capital controls remain at elevated levels as shown in Figure A1. 
Dismantling capital controls can enable greater access to overseas borrowing that can meet 
firms’ much-needed foreign financing to import capital goods, to setup new foreign projects, 
or to modernize or expand existing units. Second, financial liberalization is likely to spur 
productivity and innovation, especially in emerging economies (Shu and Steinwender, 2018). 
Besides, in the era of financial globalization, India is linked to other developed markets in terms 
of international policy spillovers from the US and Europe to emerging markets with 
implications for financial stability (Rajan, 2014). Examining the firm-level evidence in view 
of this FEMA policy experiment helps validate the role of overseas debt market access in a 
liberalized regime, thereby making a novel contribution to the literature.  
Our baseline results, which survive several robustness tests, are summarized as follows. 
Firms that benefit from FEMA display higher productivity and consequently higher export 
intensity compared to firms with only domestic sources of financing. Moreover, our results 
suggest that firms increase their productivity following the policy change, but even more so if 
they are financially vulnerable, as measured by high levels of debt and low levels of liquidity. 
Our findings have an important policy implication —they make a case for easing capital 
controls to improve firm performance in other countries that maintain restrictive capital 
accounts.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in two important ways. First, it adds to the 
literature on financial liberalization and firm performance (see, for instance, Bekaert et al., 
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2005; Quinn and Toyoda, 2008). We extend this literature by analyzing the link between an 
underexplored but important financial reform and firms’ productivity and exporting intensity. 
Exploiting India's foreign exchange liberalization, through the lens of FEMA, allows us to 
provide a systematic analysis of how (lowered) capital constraints affect productivity and the 
intensive margin of trade activity.  
Second, this study takes its place in the burgeoning literature on firm heterogeneity and real 
activities (see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Melitz and Redding, 2014; Chen and Guariglia, 
2013; Ferrando and Ruggieri, 2018). However, we focus on the interplay among FEMA reform 
and varying degrees of firm heterogeneity. Our study shows that firms which display higher 
levels of debt and lower liquidity can improve their performance in response to a policy shift 
that alters their ability to raise external funding. To the best of our knowledge, this channel has 
not been previously documented.  
This paper is structured as follows. In section two, we provide the background for FEMA 
reform and develop our testable hypotheses thereafter. In section three, we describe the 
econometric modelling strategy. We present the data in our empirical analysis along with 
summary statistics in section four, and we report the econometric results in section five. In 
section six, we subject our models to various robustness tests, and finally, in section seven, we 
provide concluding remarks. 
2. Background and hypotheses  
2.1 The FEMA reform 
During the past four decades, India has embarked on a journey of continuous changes in trade 
policy, removing anti-export and pro-import-substitution bias. The restrictive regime of the 
1970s and the 1980s gave rise to pro-liberalization policies. This involved replacing the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), in place since 1973, with the more market-friendly 
5 
 
Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) in the winter session of parliament in 1999. The 
idea was to support foreign exchange transactions in both capital and current accounts to 
achieve greater trade and financial openness. FEMA’s key objective is to facilitate foreign trade 
and payments involving foreign exchange, consistent with full current-account convertibility 
and progressive liberalization of capital-account transactions to promote orderly maintenance 
of the foreign exchange market.1 In short, one of the key objectives of FEMA reform is to help 
Indian firms settle into foreign markets.  
Historically, Indian interest rates have always been higher than interest rates offshore. That 
could encourage domestic firms to borrow at cheaper rates overseas. Before FEMA, however, 
firms needed to seek the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s permission to borrow from overseas 
debt markets, restricting them from exposure to foreign currency borrowing. FEMA removed 
the RBI preauthorization requirement, enabling firms to borrow up to a certain amount per 
year.2 Under FEMA, the maximum amount of ECB an individual firm can raise increased 
gradually since the introduction of the regulatory framework (currently USD $750 million or 
equivalent during a financial year). The limit can mitigate systemic risk due to currency 
mismatch or excessive borrowing.  
According to the information that we can glean from our data, after FEMA the ECB amount 
was six times higher. Average foreign borrowing before FEMA was USD $6.20 million 
(standard deviation = 146.71), but after FEMA it was USD $40.36 million (standard deviation 
= 536.75). Moreover, the difference between the means is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This suggests that following FEMA, firms raise significantly more ECB. Hence, FEMA 
                                                          
1 More specifically, FEMA was intended to grow India’s exports and procurement of imported raw materials and 
capital goods needed for rapid industrial growth. Patnaik et al. (2015) provide a detailed account of the existing 
regulations, including recent policy changes on capital controls for foreign currency borrowing by Indian firms. 
2 In a given year, the government also puts a ceiling for the total amount of ECBs that all Indian firms may obtain. 
This aggregate limit is currently USD $40 billion a year. 
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is likely to help all outward-oriented firms to raise the required foreign currency financing in 
order to boost their performance.  
2.2 Development of hypotheses 
2.2.1 Capital-account liberalization and firm performance 
A large and growing body of research shows that capital account restrictions can affect several 
dimensions of real firm activity, such as investment and productivity. For example, Bekaert et 
al. (2005) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) are among the first to show that capital account 
liberalization leads to higher economic growth. Further, cross-country studies show that 
financial openness affects growth primarily through higher productivity (Bekaert et al., 2011). 
Bai et al. (2018) support the view regarding the link between improvements in financial 
markets and economic growth and argue that increases in aggregate productivity play a key 
role in driving these gains.  
More recent work focuses on micro data. Campello and Larrain (2016), for instance, 
study recent reforms across Eastern European countries and document that after the policy 
shifts, firms are given more flexibility and an enlarged contracting space to carry out credit 
transactions. Therefore, such reforms have the potential to trigger real economic responses. 
Larrain and Stumpner (2017) study how capital-account liberalization affects firm capital 
allocation and aggregate productivity in 10 Eastern European countries. Their findings suggest 
that the policy shift increases aggregate productivity through more efficient allocation of 
capital across firms. Importantly, they find that capital account openness, as measured by the 
Chinn-Ito index, is positively associated with financial development and negatively related to 
the cost of lending.  
The above argument is well aligned with the case of India because Shu and Steinwender 
(2018) show that in emerging countries, trade liberalization appears to spur productivity and 
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innovation. In addition, Varela (2018) uses firm-level census data to study the impact of a 
financial reform in Hungary on aggregate productivity. The findings of this study suggest that 
the reform, which revoked capital controls previously imposed on international borrowing, 
leads to higher aggregate productivity.  
In the context of FEMA in India, which aims to help firms access funds from abroad, 
such easing of financing access should encourage firms’ investment in technology and 
improvement of productivity. This can be achieved through hiring higher skilled workers, 
adopting new technologies, and building better and high-quality products. The implication is 
that more productive firms following the FEMA reform should be able to attract a larger share 
of foreign buyers and improve their exporting status. Accordingly, there is a link between 
capital-account restrictions and firm performance. Hence, the first hypothesis in the empirical 
analysis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Following FEMA, treated firms are more likely to increase their productivity 
relative to control firms without any foreign borrowing and consequently improve their export 
intensity.3 
2.2.2 Financial vulnerability 
The role of financial health in firms’ performance is well established in the literature. 
Specifically, there is empirical evidence which shows that financial constraints affect firms’ 
real activities by distorting the optimal allocation of production inputs (see, for instance, 
Almeida and Campello, 2007; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Campello and Chen, 2010). When 
financially vulnerable firms, for whom access to financial markets is prohibitively expensive, 
gain access to external borrowing, they are able to engage in productivity enhancing 
investment. For instance, Gatti and Love (2008) estimate the effects of access to credit on Total 
                                                          
3 By treated we refer to exporting firms with foreign financing under 
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Factor Productivity (TFP). They find access to credit to be positively and strongly associated 
with firm productivity. Aghion et al. (2010) show that firms associated with financial 
constraints forego long-term investment opportunities, which contribute more to productivity 
growth.  
Other studies document that financial frictions can play an important role in firms’ 
productivity. Chen and Guariglia (2013) show that Chinese firms’ productivity is significantly 
and positively affected by the availability of internal finance. Ferrando et al. (2018) find a 
negative and significant estimate for the elasticity of TFP with financial constraints. Access to 
financing is also a well-established, critical factor in export activities (see, for example, 
Greenaway et al., 2007; Bellone et al., 2010; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Minetti and Zhu, 
2011).4 Motivated by this consideration, we examine how firm-level vulnerability affects 
productivity and exporting following the policy intervention. Overall, after the implementation 
of the financial reform, firms that are highly indebted should be able to improve their 
productivity. A positive association between debt and productivity may be explained by the 
bankruptcy argument: a high level of leverage increases moral hazard and thus the probability 
that the firm will go bankrupt. Therefore, managers have incentives to try and improve 
productivity to avoid firm closure (Chen and Guariglia, 2013). Moreover, Chen and Guariglia 
(2013) show that illiquid firms’ productivity is severely constrained. Therefore, we should 
expect firms with low liquidity to improve their performance after the passage of the law 
compared to their more liquid counterparts. In turn, the second hypothesis is as follows:  
                                                          
4 Recent empirical literature analyzes the impact of credit disruptions on trade, both at the extensive and the 
intensive margins (see Bricongne et al., 2012; Chor and Manova, 2012; Paravisini et al., 2015; Görg and Spaliara, 
2018). 
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Hypothesis 2: Following FEMA, financially vulnerable firms benefit more from access to 
foreign external finance and thus are more productive and show higher export intensity 
compared to their counterparts. 
3 Empirical methodology 
3.1 Baseline model 
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating how firms’ productivity changes around FEMA 
reform. We estimate our productivity model using a difference-in-differences estimator. We 
then examine whether firms that experience an improvement in their productivity after FEMA 
enjoy higher export intensity. For the purpose of the exporting model, we follow Elsas and 
Florysiak (2015) and adopt a doubly censored Tobit estimator with censoring at 0 and 1. This 
estimator is unbiased and consistent using both an unbalanced dynamic panel with a fractional 
dependent variable and unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity.5 This method is 
particularly suited for our purpose, given that export intensity is measured as the ratio of exports 
to total sales, which is bounded between 0 and 1.6 We opt to estimate the model in a dynamic 
setting because we wish to ensure that the results are not attributable to the lack of controlling 
for state dependence in exporting.7 The estimated models are: 
𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧ = 𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଵ𝑇ݎ𝑒𝑎ݐ𝑖 ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ + 𝑎ଶ𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ + ߛ𝑖+ 𝜏௧ + ߜ𝑛௧ + 𝜗௦௧ + ߝ𝑖𝑛௦௧                            (1)                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                            ܧሺܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧|𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ, ܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ, 𝐶𝑖ሻ =  𝜑ሺ𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଵ𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ + 𝑎ଶ𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ + 𝑎ଷܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ + 𝑎ସ𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ +     𝜏௧ + ߜ𝑛௧ + 𝜗ݏݐ + 𝐶𝑖ሻ                                                                                      (2)                 
where 𝒾 = 1, 2, …., N refers to firms in sector 𝑛 in state (region) ݏ for time period 𝓉.  TFP 
stands for total factor productivity calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) 
                                                          
5 In unreported regressions we find that estimating the models with a static probit fractional model does not alter 
our results.  
6 In our sample, 48.9% of firms report zero exports. This figure is in line with Wagner (2001), in which observed 
zeros in exporting are 40.4% of the total sample. The author argues that firms opt for profit-maximizing volume 
of exports, which might be zero or a positive quantity.  
7 The lagged export share can be thought of as a proxy for sunk costs (see, for example, Meinen, 2015). 
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methodology. Treat is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm raises external currency borrowing 
(ECB) in 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise.8 FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 for observations for 
the post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest in equation 
(1) is 𝑎ଵ, which measures the difference in productivity between treated and control firms in 
the post-FEMA period. Put differently, the point estimate measures how the policy affects 
productivity of firms with access to ECB versus firms with access to only domestic borrowing. 
Further, in equation (2), we incorporate the estimated TFP (𝑇ܨ?̂?) from equation (1) to 
assess the response of export intensity (EXP) to changes in productivity after the start of 
FEMA. To avoid the generated regression problem since we do not observe but rather estimate 
TFP (see Pagan, 1984), the standard errors are obtained by using a bootstrap procedure. The 
coefficient of interest is 𝑎ଵ, which shows whether firms that enjoy higher productivity after 
FEMA are able to improve their export intensity relative to firms that are less productive. A 
positive coefficient for Treat*FEMA supports H1.  
The models include additional controls: firm fixed effects (ߛ𝑖) to account for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity, year fixed effects (𝜏௧) to account for possible business cycle 
effects, as well as year*industry (ߜ𝑛௧ሻ and year*state fixed effects (𝜗௦௧) to control for other 
industry and time-varying shocks that could affect firms differently in the treated and control 
groups.9 Following Papke and Wooldridge (2008), 𝐶𝑖 is the unobserved effect which can be 
modelled by the time averages of  𝑥?̅?. Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
We add to the models various firm-specific characteristics (captured by vector x in 
equations (1) and (2)) as control variables that also help determine their productivity and 
                                                          
8 We also use an alternative treated group of firms that do not have access to ECB in the pre-reform period but 
have access to ECB during the post-reform period. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
in our main models. 
9 Our models include various fixed effects to control for the possibility that firms may raise foreign currency 
borrowings for speculative purposes and maybe affected by other reforms such as industrial liberalization, FDI 
liberalization, and financial liberalization in the early and mid-1990s. 
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exporting performance. We lag all time-varying firm-specific variables by one period to reduce 
possible simultaneity problems (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2007). 
We first introduce Size, measured as real total assets. Large firms cope well with financial 
constraints and have greater access to external financing, which is necessary to cover the sunk 
and fixed costs of exports (Bernard and Jensen, 1999 and Greenaway et al., 2007). Also, there 
is a significant firm size-productivity relationship as larger firms are more likely to engage in 
technological innovation resulting in improved productivity (Crespi and Zuniga, 2012). 
Therefore, we expect Size to be positively associated with productivity and export intensity.  
Wage is measured by the total wage bill adjusted by GDP deflator. This variable 
controls for systematic differences between firms in terms of human capital (Bellone et al., 
2010). A stylized fact in the trade literature is that foreign firms pay higher wages, but we also 
observe the opposite effect in determining the probability of entry into export markets (see 
Greenaway et al., 2007). We argue that this is an empirical issue determined by the data.  
Finally, we consider two important aspects of firm financial health: leverage and 
liquidity (see Greenaway et al., 2007). Debt is the ratio of short-term debt to current assets and 
accounts for the firm’s dependency primarily on bank debt. Liquidity is the ratio of current 
assets less current liabilities over total assets. Firms with less leverage and more liquidity are 
generally considered in better financial shape and should be more successful in exporting. 
Hence, we anticipate a positive (negative) relationship between Liquidity (Debt) and export 
intensity.  
3.2 Accounting for financial vulnerability 
In this subsection our main interest lies in examining whether firms facing different levels of 
financial vulnerability within the treated group exhibit different sensitivities in their 
productivity and exporting shares after FEMA, compared to firms in the control group.  We 
focus on two dimensions of financial vulnerability: debt and liquidity. We augment equation 
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(1) with interactions between the policy effects and the indicators of firm-level vulnerability. 
This exercise is based on the consideration that when FEMA takes place, firms that are highly 
indebted or display lower levels of liquidity, should respond more strongly in terms of 
productivity compared to their counterparts. Formally, we estimate the following models: 
𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧ = 𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଵ𝑇ݎ𝑒𝑎ݐ𝑖 ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ ∗ ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ଶ𝑇ݎ𝑒𝑎ݐ𝑖 ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ + 𝑎ଷܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ ∗ ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ସ𝑇ݎ𝑒𝑎ݐ𝑖 ∗ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ହܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎଺𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ + ߛ𝑖+ 𝜏௧ + ߜ𝑛௧ + 𝜗௦௧ + ߝ𝑖𝑛௦௧                                                       (3)                                 
 ܧሺܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧|𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ, ܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ, 𝐶𝑖ሻ =  𝜑ሺ𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଵ𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ ∗ ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ଶ𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ ∗ ܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ +     𝑎ଷܨܧ𝑀𝐴௧ ∗ ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ସ𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ ∗ ܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎ହܨ𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎ݎ𝑖௧ + 𝑎଺𝑇ܨ𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧̂ + 𝑎଻ܧ𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ + 𝑎଼𝑥𝑖𝑛௦௧−ଵ +      𝜏௧ + ߜ𝑛௧ + 𝜗௦௧ + 𝐶𝑖ሻ               (4)                                     
where Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the 
top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as 
firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. The main term is the triple-interaction coefficient of 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar, which measures whether firms that rely on more debt financing or have 
lower liquidity improve their productivity following FEMA; this compares to firms with access 
only to domestic borrowing in the pre-FEMA period. A positive coefficient for Treat*FEMA 
and a positive coefficient for Treat*FEMA*Finvar support H2. The remaining control 
variables and fixed effects remain unchanged. 
4 Data and summary statistics 
4.1 The dataset 
We construct our dataset from profit and loss and balance sheet data assembled by the Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and its Prowess database. CMIE is a private research 
organization in India that collects data and makes it available through Prowess.10 The Prowess 
                                                          
10
 See www.cmie.com for more information on the Prowess database, which is widely used in the literature for 
firm-level analysis on the capital structure of Indian firms (see, for example, Vig, 2013).  
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database covers large and medium-size Indian firms with detailed information on over 25,346 
firms. The majority of the companies in the database are listed on the stock exchange.  
Following normal selection criteria, we exclude firm-years with missing values for export 
sales and other control variables in the main models. In addition, we exclude observations in 
the 1% of the upper and lower tails of the distribution of all control variables to control for 
outliers. Finally, the panel has an unbalanced structure with 80,996 observations over the 
period 1988-2014. Our sampled firms operate in different sectors, such as manufacturing, 
utilities, resources, services and non-banking financial services.11 
4.2 Summary statistics 
To provide a simple visual account of the response of firms’ productivity and exporting over 
the sample period, we present figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 graphs the evolution of TFP among 
Indian firms over the period 1988-2014, disentangling treated firms from control firms. The 
vertical line indicates the change in policy. It shows a rise in productivity of the first group of 
firms after the policy change in 2000, compared to the second group of firms. This picture is 
mirrored in figure 2, which depicts the share of exports, rising nearly continuously after FEMA 
took effect in 2000 only for the treated group. Both graphs support the model’s parallel-trends 
assumption, suggesting that in the absence of the reform both the treated and control groups 
exhibit a similar growth trend in their productivity and export shares. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the main variables of interest. We report means and 
standard deviations for the whole sample (column 1), treated and control groups before the 
FEMA reform (columns 2 and 3), and for the same groups of firms after the FEMA change 
                                                          
11 Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFC) are establishments that provide financial services and banking 
facilities without meeting the legal definition of a Bank. They are covered under the Banking regulations laid 
down by the Reserve Bank of India and provide banking services like loans, credit facilities, retirement planning, 
investing and stocking in money market. However, they are restricted from taking any form of deposits from the 
general public. 
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(columns 5 and 6).12 We also report p-values for the test of equality of means between treated 
and control groups before and after FEMA reform (columns 4 and 7, respectively). To begin 
with TFP and export share, we observe that before FEMA, the difference in the means between 
treated and control groups is insignificant. However, post-FEMA, treated firms experience a 
significant increase in both TFP and export share, which is not the case for the control group.13 
With respect to firm-level variables before the policy, treated firms are larger, pay higher 
average wages, and display healthier balance sheets. Moving to columns 5 and 6, there is a 
significant difference in the mean values of all variables for treated and control groups.  
Taken together, the preliminary statistics suggest that firms’ performance may be related 
to the introduction of FEMA and that access to external borrowing is associated with 
differences in the balance sheet indicators. The following sections provide a formal regression 
analysis on the relationship between the policy initiative and firms’ productivity and export 
share, paying attention to the role of firm-level financial vulnerability. 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 The baseline models 
We begin our analysis by examining how the policy change affects productivity. We then 
examine the impact of the estimated productivity, after FEMA started, on export share. Table 
2, panel A shows the results from the estimation of equation (1). We present estimation results 
in subsequent columns to include different fixed effects that can help us strengthen our 
identification. We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics with standard errors clustered by 
                                                          
12 We report the correlation matrix among all variables used in the paper in table A1 in the appendix.  
13 We decompose the export share to gauge the evolution of the numerator and the denominator separately. We 
find that a decline in sales does not drive the increase in export share. In table A2 in the appendix we show that 
both exports and sales rise significantly after FEMA.  
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firm. The general finding is that FEMA positively and significantly, both statistically and 
economically, affects firm productivity. 
Our key variable of interest is the interaction between the firm-level Treat dummy and the 
policy dummy FEMA (Treat*FEMA). This shows the impact of the policy change in 2000 on 
TFP.14 Controlling for firm characteristics and macroeconomic shocks, FEMA’s impact is 
substantial for treated firms, as demonstrated by the positive coefficient on the interaction term 
in column 1 of table 2. Following FEMA, firms with access to ECB improve their productivity 
compared to firms only with access to domestic borrowing. Hence, easing financing helps firms 
to increase their productivity. The results show qualitatively and quantitatively significant 
effects. Based on the estimates of column 1, treated firms increase productivity by 15.5 
percentage points after the financial reform. Moving to the following columns of table 2, we 
re-run the same regressions and find that the main result persists even after controlling for other 
industry and time-varying shocks that could affect firms differently in the treated and control 
group.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we present estimates of equation (2) taking into account the estimated 
TFP from equation (1). We report marginal effects and z-statistics with standard errors 
clustered by firm. Note that in all models, we add time averages of firm-level variables to allow 
for time-constant unobserved effects that are correlated with our explanatory variables (Papke 
and Wooldridge, 2008). The coefficients on the double interaction 𝑇ܨ?̂?*FEMA are positive 
and highly significant in all three specifications. The total effect of FEMA is given by the sum 
of the marginal effect of 𝑇ܨ?̂? plus the 𝑇ܨ?̂?*FEMA interaction marginal effect multiplied by 
the standard deviation of 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Focusing on the estimates in column 1 of panel B, a one-
                                                          
14 Our findings are robust to using labor productivity instead of TFP. In addition, our results hold when the TFP 
models are estimated in a dynamic setting (see tables A3 and A4 in the appendix).  
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standard-deviation rise in 𝑇ܨ𝑃 ̂would significantly raise export intensity by 4 percentage 
points.15 
This finding implies that firms that enjoy higher productivity after the introduction of 
FEMA increase their export intensity relative to firms that are less productive. Our results are 
valuable in light of previous studies, as we suggest that firms with access to foreign borrowing 
under the ECB framework are more likely to face lower financial constraints, are subject to 
fewer distortions, and hence are able to build better- and high-quality products. In this sense 
firms can attract foreign consumers and thus expand further in terms of global sales. Therefore, 
our findings provide strong support for our first hypothesis that firms tapping foreign currency 
financing increase their productivity and consequently their export share relative to firms 
without any foreign borrowing. 
Coming to our control variables, the coefficient on Size is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This is in line with previous studies suggesting that export intensity and productivity 
increase with firm size as larger firms have better access to external finance and tend to be 
more innovative. The results further illustrate that lagged export status is positive and highly 
significant in the export-intensity equation, indicating the importance of sunk costs in 
exporting. In addition, we find that the export-to-sales ratio decreases with the lagged wage per 
employee (a puzzling finding also in Greenaway et al., 2007) when controlling for firm size. 
In terms of financial indicators, highly indebted firms face higher credit risk and display a lower 
export intensity. This reverses when we consider the coefficients on liquidity, which are 
positive and highly significant across all specifications. Hence, as Greenaway et al. (2007) 
suggest, financial health is an important determinant of exporting. 
                                                          
15 The overall effect is calculated as follows: marginal effect of 𝑇ܨ?̂? (0.11) + marginal effect of 𝑇ܨ?̂?*FEMA 
(0.17) *standard deviation of 𝑇ܨ?̂? (0.17) = 0.040. 
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5.2 The role of financial vulnerability  
In this section, we focus on how access to foreign financing affects the level of productivity 
for different types of firms, namely those that rely more on debt or are less liquid. The results 
for debt as an indicator for financial vulnerability are given in table 3. Panel A reports results 
for productivity, followed by export intensity in panel B.   
We pay attention to the sign and significance of the triple-interaction term 
(Treat*FEMA*Finvar) which reveals whether firms that are more financially vulnerable, are 
likely to improve their productivity compared to their counterparts in the pre-FEMA period. 
We find that, following the FEMA reform, TFP is more sensitive for financially vulnerable 
firms that use more debt and it is less sensitive for less indebted firms. In particular, considering 
the double-interaction term Treat*FEMA, we find a positive and highly significant coefficient, 
which implies that treated firms increase their productivity after FEMA by 21.8 percentage 
points. Importantly, the increase in productivity is even more prevalent for financially 
vulnerable firms by 4.5 percentage points, as shown in the triple-interaction term 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar.  
In panel B of table 3 we present the impact of the estimated TFP after FEMA on exporting. 
In particular, considering the double-interaction term 𝑇ܨ?̂?*FEMA, we find a positive and 
highly significant coefficient, which implies that high-productivity firms increase their export 
intensity after FEMA by 1.2 percentage points. Importantly, the increase in export intensity is 
even more prevalent for firms with higher levels of debt, as shown in the triple-interaction term 𝑇ܨ?̂?*FEMA*Finvar. A one-standard-deviation rise in the estimated TFP would significantly 
raise export intensity by 1.8 percentage points. The findings point to a strong link between 
productivity, firms’ debt exposure and export intensity. This novel finding also highlights the 
link between productivity and financial reforms. A priori, we expect improvements in firms’ 
access to foreign financing to help them diversify their sources of financing and the associated 
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risks. This additional source of income provides greater assurance to lenders regarding the 
firms’ financial health and relaxes their liquidity constraints. When a financial reform such as 
FEMA takes place, we find that financially vulnerable firms improve their productivity and 
then their export performance. As far as we are aware, this is the first paper to make this point, 
and we document the amplification channel through which more indebted firms enjoy higher 
productivity and better export performance compared to their counterparts. 
Next, we move to liquidity as an alternative indicator of firms’ financial vulnerability as 
shown in table 4. The estimation results in panel A show that when firms with low liquidity 
receive foreign financing, they can expand their productivity compared to firms within the 
control group. This finding is robust across various specifications. Notably, this effect is 
magnified by 8.3 percentage points if a firm is financially vulnerable. In panel B the marginal 
estimates imply that modifying a firm’s sources of external financing can raise exporting 
intensity by 1.6 percentage points if they are less liquid and enjoy high productivity. Last, the 
pattern in the point estimates for our control variables is similar as before. 
In summary, our results provide strong empirical support for H2 and H3 because we find 
that financially vulnerable firms respond more strongly the policy reform. They demonstrate a 
higher degree of informational asymmetry and hence are more subject to financial constraints. 
Thus, when they gain access to foreign currency borrowing, they are able to meet higher trade 
or productivity costs and improve their performance.  
6 Robustness tests 
6.1 Different time windows 
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It is likely that contemporaneous economic and financial events occurring during the 28-year 
sample period affect the treated and control firms.16 The difference-in-differences setting partly 
resolves this potential concern with various fixed effects to shut down channels that may 
influence firms in a different way during the sample period. However, to ensure our results are 
not affected by pre- or post-reform confounding shocks, we perform an additional analysis by 
considering shorter time windows. In particular, we limit our analysis to five years before the 
reform and five years after the reform to obtain a symmetric time window.17  
We report the results in table 5. We confirm that firms improve their productivity after 
FEMA with implications for their export share. We further corroborate that the policy initiative 
is more potent for firms that can raise higher levels of debt and are less liquid. Thus, limiting 
the sample period to five years around FEMA does not affect our results.  
6.2 Placebo test 
We also test whether pre-policy trends that may have a bearing on our identification strategy 
influence our results.18 In the budget of 1997-1998, the government proposed to replace FERA-
1973 with FEMA, which the parliament approved in 1999. The Act came into force on June 1, 
2000. To verify if this underlying trend affects our results, we conduct a difference-in-
differences estimation assuming that the policy change took place in 1997.19 If any pre-policy 
trends affect our results, we should see a positive impact on productivity and then on export 
                                                          
16  For example, India initiated its economic liberalization policy in 1991-1993 and reduced tariff and interest 
rates, ended public monopolies, and allowed automatic approval of FDI. Export-import (Exim) policy was 
introduced in 1992-1997, which eliminated the system of licenses and quantitative restrictions to reduce the scope 
of public-sector monopoly sharply for most export items and a good number of import items. The second phase 
of economic liberalization was during 1998-1999, and there was a global financial crisis in 2007-2009.  
17 The choice of the time window is robust to modifications.  
18
 We employ a different quantitative test for pre-trends by using lags/leads. The results remain unchanged to this 
modification. 
19
 In other words, these time periods are chosen at random owing to the government’s proposal and the true effect 
for these years is zero. We perform difference-in-differences tests for 1996 and 1997. The results show almost 
similar results both quantitatively and qualitatively to the 1997-1999 reform period. For details on this approach, 
see Imberman and Kugler (2012) and Bose et al. (2019).  
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share. Failing to recognize any significant effects for these placebo time periods supports the 
reliability of the chosen treatment period. 
Table 6 shows results for the placebo time periods. They show, consistently across all 
model estimates, FEMA’s insignificant effect on productivity and export share. We do not find 
any differential effect for firms that are more indebted or less liquid. All in all, this test confirms 
the validity of our identification strategy. 
6.3 Alternative definition of the treated group 
In our main models, treated firms raise ECB anytime during 1988-2014. In this section, we 
define the treated group of firms according to their industrial affiliations.20 Therefore, the 
treated group includes firms that raise ECB, but the control group includes firms that are 
eligible but do not raise ECB during the sample period. 
Table 7 shows the results. We find that the policy change has a significant effect on the 
productivity of firms with foreign financing. Further, we find that firms that improve their 
productivity after FEMA can boost their export share. Finally, we find that firms which are 
more indebted and have lower liquidity benefit from the policy compared to their counterparts 
with domestic financing. Thus, our results are robust to an alternative definition of the treated 
group. 
6.4 Addressing endogeneity concerns 
We carry out an additional sensitivity test aimed at dealing with potential endogenous variables 
in our regression models as variables such as size, wage, debt, liquidity, and exporting are all 
                                                          
20 The list of entities eligible to raise ECB includes companies in the manufacturing and software development 
sectors, shipping and airlines companies, companies in the infrastructure sector, nonbanking financial companies, 
holding companies and core investment companies, real estate investment trusts and infrastructure investment 
trusts, microfinance institutions, companies engaged in miscellaneous services viz. research and development 
(R&D), training (other than educational institutes), companies supporting infrastructure, and companies providing 
logistics services. Finally, we include companies engaged in maintenance, repair, overhaul, and freight 
forwarding. 
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likely to be endogenous. We estimate our models with a System-Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator that combines in one system the relevant equation in first 
differences and in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998).21 
Instruments include all firm-specific variables lagged three times or more in the productivity 
and exporting models. 
In panel A of table 8, we find evidence in support of the view that productivity rises 
after FEMA. Therefore, we concur with our main findings that a firm with access to foreign 
currency borrowing is likely to increase productivity that further results in higher export 
intensity. In panel B we further confirm the importance of the policy for firms with higher debt 
and lower liquidity. At the bottom of each panel, we report p-values for two diagnostic tests: 
the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, and the serial correlation tests. Overall, the 
statistics show that the instruments are valid and that there is no sign of misspecification in the 
model. 
6.5 Additional productivity channels 
In this sub-section we isolate two channels through which firms can improve their productivity 
after FEMA. In particular, we focus on staff training and technological sophistication. For the 
former indicator, we rely on firms’ expenses on staff training, while for the latter variable we 
distinguish whether firms belong to a high-technology sector or not.22 The intuition behind 
these additional tests is as follows. Firms which spend resources on staff training can enhance 
                                                          
21 A way to check whether the First-Differenced GMM estimator is affected by the finite sample bias is to compare 
the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained from the latter estimator with those 
obtained from the OLS and the Within Groups (WG) estimators (see Bond et al., 2001). Table A5 reports the 
coefficients on the lagged exporting intensity obtained from the above mentioned estimators. We find that GMM 
estimates of the coefficient on lagged exporting intensity fall close or below the corresponding estimate obtained 
using the WG estimator. We can conclude that the First-Differenced GMM estimator is subject to serious finite 
sample bias, thus, we opt for estimating the models using the System-GMM. 
22 Staff training expenses are measured as the expenditure on staff welfare and training as a proportion of total 
compensation to employees. High technology sectors contain high technology manufacturing industries, medium-
high technology manufacturing industries and knowledge intensive service sectors. See Eurostat (2011) and 
Mallick and Yang (2013) for more details on these sectors. 
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their productivity as employees gain knowledge and/or capabilities that they can use to improve 
their tasks (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001; Van de Wiele, 2010). Also, firms in high-tech 
industries have the highest degree of sophistication, technological content, and R&D intensity 
and are more likely to achieve competitive gains in the exporting market (Minetti et al., 2015). 
Table 9 shows the results. We continue to observe that following the FEMA reform, 
firms that invest in human capital and those that belong to high-tech industries are more likely 
to improve their productivity leading to an increase in their export intensity compared to their 
counterparts.  
6.6 Additional tests for financial vulnerability 
 In our main empirical results, we partition firms according to their financial vulnerability if 
debt (or liquidity) is in the top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of debt (or liquidity) for all 
firms in the same industry as firm i in that year. In order to ensure that our results are not due 
to the way that we divide our sample, we carry out three additional tests. First, we use the 50th 
percentile as an alternative cut-off point for both criteria.  Second, given that the majority of 
our sample firms are listed on the stock exchange, we define financially vulnerable firms using 
the volatility of their return on equity, calculated as the standard deviation of return on equity. 
This is measured over a rolling window of five years. Finally, we focus on two more 
dimensions of financial vulnerability: size and the degree to which firms can pledge 
collateral.23  
We then re-estimate the models from tables 3-4 and report the results in tables 10 and 
11. We continue to observe that following the FEMA reform, financially vulnerable firms, 
irrespective of the definition used, are more likely to improve their productivity leading to an 
                                                          
23 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provide evidence that firm size is a particularly useful predictor of financial 
constraints. In addition, Manova (2008) shows that entrepreneurs can raise external financing easier if they pledge 
collateral; lack of collateral makes it costlier for exporters to obtain external financing. 
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increase in their export intensity compared to their counterparts. In summary, our main 
empirical results are robust to alternative cut-off values and definitions of financial 
vulnerability. 
7 Conclusion 
Despite greater globalization of Indian firms in the last two decades, their access to 
international debt markets remains largely restricted. There has been limited focus on how this 
affects firm performance. One argument is that firms with foreign financing have better 
production and innovation networks with overseas market participants, which could boost their 
performance and exporting intensity. Using a rich panel dataset for India, this paper shows that 
firms with foreign financing display higher productivity relative to firms with only domestic 
sources of financing. We also find this effect has implications for firms’ exporting intensity. 
Finally, we document that this relationship is more sensitive for financially vulnerable firms 
after the FEMA reform.  
Our study is policy relevant. Countries that maintain restrictive capital accounts can 
improve their performance by gradually easing capital controls. The development of diversified 
sources of external finance should become a priority in the national governments’ agenda. This 
will help to facilitate the development of a balanced economy and to create appropriate 
conditions that will enhance companies’ competitive advantages in increasing their 
productivity and ultimately their export intensity. We suggest that policies aimed at making 
foreign currency borrowing readily available to financially vulnerable firms would improve 
their performance.  
Given our finding of a favourable impact of relaxing capital controls, capital flight is 
unlikely to be a concern; instead greater foreign exchange inflows on the back of higher export 
intensity could support the currency value. Only most productive firms on the back of better 
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foreign financing access are gaining improvement in their exporting intensity; such access to 
foreign currency financing leads to better access to technology and improvement in skills, 
which help those exporting firms in improving their productivity and thereby their exporting 
performance. 
The cost of borrowing could be different for firms those who rely on foreign currency 
financing relative to domestic sources of financing. The ones who rely on foreign financing 
could be less exposed to foreign currency risk as there is no currency mismatch for these firms 
(their borrowing currency and earning currency remain the same), relative to firms who rely 
on domestic sources of financing as domestic currency appreciation can reduce the value of 
their foreign exchange earnings, reducing their ability to repay debt in domestic currency.  
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Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity for treated and control groups 
 
 
Figure 2: Export share for treated and control groups 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  FEMA=0 FEMA=1 
 Whole 
sample 
Treat Control p-
value 
Treat Control p-
value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TFP 0.24 
(0.04) 
0.26 
(0.03) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.201 0.43 
(0.16) 
0.23 
(0.01) 
0.000 
EXP 0.12 
(0.22) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.949 0.17 
(0.24) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
0.000 
Size 29.02 
(71.96) 
71.30 
(148.26) 
16.04 
(59.40) 
0.000 84.48 
(134.62) 
20.66 
(50.80) 
0.000 
Wage 1.18 
(2.34) 
2.28 
(3.29) 
0.62 
(1.62) 
0.000 2.91 
(3.56) 
0.92 
(1.96) 
0.000 
Debt 0.42 
(0.51) 
0.36 
(0.36) 
0.45 
(0.51) 
0.011 0.45 
(0.48) 
0.43 
(0.51) 
0.000 
Liquidity 0.15 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.15 
(0.18) 
0.087 0.12 
(0.17) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
0.000 
N 61,851 272 1,891  8,013 51,675  
 
Notes: The table presents sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. In columns 4 and 7 we report 
the p-values of tests of equalities of means between treated and control firms. Treat is a dummy that equals 1 if 
the firm raises ECB over the period 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation 
occurs in the post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. TFP is total factor productivity calculated using 
the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method adjusted by GDP deflator. EXP is the ratio of total exports to total sales. 
Size equals real total assets. Wage equals real total wage bill. Debt is short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity 
is current assets less current liabilities over total assets. Variables are measured in millions of Indian Rupees.  
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Table 2: Baseline model 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treat*FEMA 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.151*** 
 (3.04) (3.06) (2.95) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.09) (5.26) (5.21) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.154*** 
 (5.51) (3.93) (4.81) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
 (7.35) (6.88) (8.24) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 
 (36.33) (8.76) (48.67) 
Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (7.89) (5.45) (7.91) 
Wage -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-1.85) (-3.19) (-6.12) 
Debt -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (-18.48) (-2.32) (-3.45) 
Liquidity 0.008*** 0.008* 0.008*** 
 (4.45) (1.75) (21.01) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit 
models introduced by Elsas and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and 
exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm raises external currency borrowing (ECB) 
over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the 
post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Size equals real total assets. Wage equals real total wage bill. 
Debt is short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag 
all firm-level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical 
significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).  
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Table 3: Accounting for financial vulnerability: Debt 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Finvar = Debt 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar 0.045*** 0.039** 0.039** 
 (2.74) (2.43) (2.42) 
Treat*FEMA 0.218*** 0.223*** 0.213*** 
 (3.86) (3.97) (3.81) 
Treat*Finvar 0.044** 0.039** 0.041** 
 (2.29) (2.02) (2.17) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.094*** 
 (-11.24) (-10.84) (-10.81) 
Finvar -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.115*** 
 (-13.20) (-13.02) (-13.12) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.65) (3.96) (3.90) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar 0.013*** 0.009** 0.009*** 
 (3.70) (2.21) (3.44) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015** 
 (3.18) (15.05) (2.53) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.59) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.027*** -0.022* -0.024*** 
 (-7.56) (-1.78) (-5.54) 
Finvar 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 (1.42) (1.30) (1.08) 𝐓𝐅?̂? -0.003 0.001*** -0.001 
 (-0.10) (3.75) (-0.22) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 
 (69.74) (25.64) (24.68) 
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (5.94) (4.99) (4.64) 
Wage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-24.33) (-4.84) (-5.27) 
Debt -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-10.77) (-2.11) (-2.29) 
Liquidity 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (2.43) (17.88) (2.98) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt is in the top 25% of the 
distribution of debt for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Size equals real total assets. Wage equals real total 
wage bill. Debt is short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all firm-level 
variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 4: Accounting for financial vulnerability: Liquidity 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Finvar = Liquid 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (3.65) (3.40) (3.45) 
Treat*FEMA 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.197*** 
 (3.61) (3.72) (3.58) 
Treat*Finvar 0.026 0.020 0.018 
 (1.24) (0.97) (0.86) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (-8.73) (-8.99) (-8.95) 
Finvar -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 (-15.69) (-15.89) (-15.88) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.92) (3.28) (3.23) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar 0.006*** 0.014** 0.011*** 
 (3.78) (2.18) (3.96) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 
 (4.66) (6.58) (3.52) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 
 (-1.45) (-1.23) (-1.34) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.003 -0.018** -0.019 
 (-0.10) (-2.52) (-0.68) 
Finvar 0.001 0.015 0.010 
 (1.51) (1.46) (1.57) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.81) (2.62) (3.58) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.332*** 0.334*** 0.334*** 
 (50.98) (43.56) (95.62) 
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (12.30) (8.51) (10.89) 
Wage -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-114.97) (-7.08) (-9.59) 
Debt -0.002 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (-1.13) (-2.00) (-2.04) 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.003** 0.003*** 
 (5.53) (2.20) (10.85) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE No Yes Yes 
Year*State FE No No Yes 
 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if liquidity is in the bottom 25% of 
the distribution of liquidity for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Size equals real total assets. Wage equals 
real total wage bill. Debt is short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all firm-
level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 5: Robustness: Implementing different time windows 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = 
Debt 
Finvar = 
Liquid 
Treat*FEMA 0.090** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
 (2.08) (2.87) (2.82) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.063** 0.077** 
  (2.28) (2.16) 
Treat*Finvar - 0.053*** 0.002 
  (2.85) (0.06) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.127*** -0.099*** 
  (-7.96) (-5.37) 
Finvar - -0.153*** -0.184*** 
  (-9.67) (-10.78) 
Size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.05) (4.03) (4.12) 
N 21,757 21,757 21,757 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.378*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 
 (2.92) (7.82) (3.08) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.008*** 0.012*** 
  (2.99) (3.11) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - 0.006*** 0.001 
  (6.96) (0.89) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.018 -0.020 
  (-1.21) (-0.36) 
Finvar - -0.018*** -0.009 
  (-5.62) (-1.43) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.010*** -0.007 -0.004 
 (12.63) (-1.56) (-0.70) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.386*** 0.386*** 0.386*** 
 (64.10) (93.49) (69.51) 
Size 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (6.40) (28.05) (3.97) 
Wage -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-28.65) (-3.06) (-18.58) 
Debt -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002 
 (-18.25) (-20.03) (-0.41) 
Liquidity 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.002 
 (7.72) (15.14) (1.55) 
N 21,725 21,725 21,725 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 for firms that raise ECB in 1995-2005, and 0 otherwise. FEMA equals 1 for observations for the post-reform period of 2000-2005, and 0 
otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of the 
debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Debt is calculated as short-term debt to current 
assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all firm-level variables by one time-period except 
for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% 
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 6: Robustness: Placebo tests 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = 
Debt 
Finvar = 
Liquid 
Treat*FEMA -0.083 -0.109 0.036 
 (-0.56) (-0.77) (0.23) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.318 -0.410 
  (0.89) (-1.51) 
Treat*Finvar - -0.006 0.159 
  (-0.03) (0.60) 
FEMA*Finvar - 0.028 0.003 
  (0.25) (0.02) 
Finvar - 0.049 0.081 
  (0.68) (0.98) 
Size 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (2.43) (2.48) (2.31) 
N 4,667 4,667 4,667 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA -0.130 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-0.89) (-0.70) (-1.53) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.010 0.005 
  (1.29) (0.63) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - -0.004 -0.006 
  (-0.77) (-1.01) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.015 -0.007 
  (-1.16) (-0.48) 
Finvar - 0.010 -0.008 
  (1.08) (0.77) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.003 0.002 0.005 
 (0.33) (0.22) (0.51) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.187*** 0.341*** 0.341*** 
 (19.01) (48.70) (49.03) 
Size -0.001 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (-0.88) (3.49) (3.65) 
Wage 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.33) (-0.89) (-0.99) 
Debt -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.90) (-0.78) (-0.20) 
Liquidity 0.012 0.006 -0.011 
 (1.05) (0.45) (-0.81) 
N 2,163 2,163 2,163 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B).  Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB in the period of 1988-1999, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 1997-1999, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the top 
(bottom) 25% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Debt is 
calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total assets.  We lag all firm-
level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 7: Robustness: Alternative treatment group 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = 
Debt 
Finvar = 
Liquid 
Treat*FEMA 0.142*** 0.204*** 0.187*** 
 (2.79) (3.66) (3.39) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.038** 0.083*** 
  (2.38) (3.83) 
Treat*Finvar - 0.033* 0.018 
  (1.31) (0.85) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.095*** -0.091*** 
  (-10.82) (-8.72) 
Finvar - -0.119*** -0.158*** 
  (-13.42) (-15.50) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.18) (4.06) (3.41) 
N 60,069 60,069 60,069 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP  𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.142*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 
 (3.99) (7.69) (2.81) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.010*** 0.013*** 
  (2.99) (4.25) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - -0.004 -0.011 
  (-1.16) (-0.31) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.025* -0.025*** 
  (-1.88) (-18.80) 
Finvar - 0.011 0.021 
  (0.94) (0.98) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.007*** -0.004 0.008** 
 (7.52) (-0.85) (2.33) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.335*** 0.338*** 0.335*** 
 (23.46) (32.29) (120.43) 
Size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (8.20) (12.45) (13.59) 
Wage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-11.94) (-15.23) (-7.57) 
Debt -0.002*** -0.004 -0.002*** 
 (-3.74) (-1.43) (-7.17) 
Liquidity 0.007*** 0.006** 0.002 
 (3.34) (2.49) (0.32) 
N 60,010 60,010 60,010 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B).  Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB in 1988-2014, and 0 for firms that are eligible but did not raise ECB during the sample. FEMA is a dummy that equals 
1 if the observation occurs in the post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm 
i if debt (or liquidity) is in the top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that 
year, and 0 otherwise. Debt is calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over 
total assets. We lag all firm-level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% 
(**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 8: Robustness: GMM estimations 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = Debt Finvar = Liquid 
Treat*FEMA 0.364** 0.527** 0.521** 
 (1.98) (2.16) (2.10) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.217*** 0.243*** 
  (2.84) (2.62) 
Treat*Finvar - -0.075 -0.046 
  (-0.25) (-0.19) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.103 -0.173** 
  (-1.63) (-2.39) 
Finvar - -0.287 -0.518** 
  (-1.07) (-2.43) 
Treat 0.836** 0.005 0.072 
 (2.30) (0.03) (0.27) 
Size 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (2.62) (4.03) (3.96) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.016 0.034 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.953 0.741 0.265 
Hansen (p-value) 0.339 0.060 0.093 
Panel B: Dependent variable  EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.797** 0.072** 0.028** 
 (2.11) (2.14) (2.51) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.013** 0.019** 
  (1.98) (2.02) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - -0.005 -0.021 
  (-0.71) (-0.88) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.001 -0.003 
  (-0.09) (-0.78) 
Finvar - -0.003 0.015 
  (-0.26) (0.26) 𝐓𝐅?̂? -0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (-0.22) (0.19) (0.15) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.777*** 0.771*** 0.929*** 
 (28.92) (27.63) (79.83) 
Size 0.004*** -0.001 0.002** 
 (3.38) (-0.45) (2.07) 
Wage 0.001 0.002 -0.001* 
 (0.45) (1.04) (-1.68) 
Debt -0.007* -0.010* -0.002 
 (-1.89) (-1.80) (-0.70) 
Liquidity 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.011 
 (3.08) (3.35) (0.58) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.317 0.374 0.229 
Hansen (p-value) 0.367 0.804 0.999 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using a System-GMM estimator. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and export intensity (Panel 
B). Treat is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm raises ECB in the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
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observation occurs in the post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt 
(or liquidity) is in the top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 
0 otherwise. Debt is calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total 
assets. In panels A and B, instruments include the firm-specific regressors lagged three times or more. Hansen is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. AR(1),  AR(2) and AR(3) are test statistics for the null hypothesis 
that there is no serial correlation of orders 1, 2, and 3 in the first-difference residuals. We lag all firm-level variables by one time-period except 
for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).  
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Table 9: Robustness: Alternative channels 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) 
 Var = Staff training  Var = High-tech  
Treat*FEMA*Var 0.298* 0.172* 
 (1.71) (1.93) 
Treat*FEMA 0.186*** 0.119** 
 (3.23) (2.11) 
Treat*Var -0.487 - 
 (-1.56)  
FEMA*Var 0.439 -0.243*** 
 (1.31) (-3.03) 
Var 0.665* - 
 (1.93)  
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.27) (2.98) 
N 61,848 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.016*** 0.004*** 
 (3.88) (5.67) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Var 0.022** 0.007** 
 (2.47) (1.97) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Var -0.007 -0.011 
 (-1.41) (-1.01) 
FEMA*Var -0.059*** -0.016 
 (-89.39) (-0.08) 
Var 0.363*** 0.045* 
 (13.87) (1.95) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.015** 0.009 
 (2.18) (0.33) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.322*** 0.323*** 
 (26.36) (65.54) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (30.96) (75.09) 
Wage -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.22) (-8.77) 
Debt -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-3.32) (-3.43) 
Liquidity 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (31.83) (40.76) 
N 61,767 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes 
 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B).  Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB in the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Var represents, in turn, staff training and high-tech sectors. Staff training is measured as the 
expenditure on staff welfare and training as a proportion of total compensation to employees. High-tech is a dummy that equals one for firms 
that belong to the high technology manufacturing industries, medium-high technology manufacturing industries and knowledge intensive 
service sectors, and 0 otherwise. We lag all firm-level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted 
at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 10: Robustness: Alternative cut-off points for financial vulnerability 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) 
 Finvar = Debt Finvar = Liquid 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar 0.038** 0.052*** 
 ( 2.11) (2.90) 
Treat*FEMA 0.199*** 0.196*** 
 (3.52) (3.50) 
Treat*Finvar -0.033 -0.001 
 (-1.61) (-0.01) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.066** -0.081*** 
 (-2.39) (-10.37) 
Finvar -0.007 -0.110*** 
 (-0.18) (-14.41) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.53) (3.36) 
N 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.016** 0.008*** 
 (2.27) (4.16) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar 0.008** 0.011** 
 (2.50) (2.35) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar -0.004 -0.009 
 (-0.36) (-0.57) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.020 -0.024 
 (-0.23) (-0.84) 
Finvar 0.012 0.017 
 (0.54) (0.41) 𝐓𝐅?̂? -0.001 0.006*** 
 (-0.06) (5.19) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.337*** 0.334*** 
 (104.39) (104.60) 
Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (25.54) (11.23) 
Wage -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.60) (-17.91) 
Debt -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (-4.10) (-4.81) 
Liquidity 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 (6.94) (10.51) 
N 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the top 
(bottom) 50% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Debt is 
calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all firm-
level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table 11: Robustness: Alternative definition of financial vulnerability 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Finvar = Vol Finvar = Size Finvar = Collateral 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar 0.034** 0.026*** 0.042* 
 (2.45) (2.95) (1.80) 
Treat*FEMA 0.116** 0.145** 0.154*** 
 (2.27) (2.32) (3.02) 
Treat*Finvar 0.006 0.020 0.026 
 (1.52) (0.76) (1.02) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.036*** -0.016*** -0.078*** 
 (-2.66) (-11.73) (-8.73) 
Finvar -0.021 -0.117*** -0.084*** 
 (-0.31) (-7.01) (-9.88) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (5.28) (2.55) (2.64) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.003** 
 (79.71) (4.06) (2.01) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.008*** 0.011* 0.007*** 
 (8.02) (1.88) (4.21) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar 0.002 -0.020 -0.001 
 (1.01) (-0.30) (-0.41) 
FEMA*Finvar -0.006*** -0.026 -0.014 
 (-57.61) (-0.21) (-0.72) 
Finvar -0.003 0.033 0.004 
 (-1.12) (1.14) (0.28) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.50) (-1.09) (-1.02) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.333*** 0.431*** 0.333*** 
 (104.68) (121.92) (106.98) 
Size 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 
 (7.48) (16.37) (3.01) 
Wage -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.72) (-4.32) (-12.53) 
Debt -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.41) (-4.53) (-3.37) 
Liquidity 0.007** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (2.25) (4.29) (3.12) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar equals 1 in a given year for firm i if the volatility of return on equity (or size and 
collateral) is in the top (or bottom) 25% of the distribution of volatility of return on equity (or size and collateral) for all firms in the same 
industry as firm i in that year, and zero otherwise. Volatility of return on equity (Vol) is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s return 
on equity, measured over a rolling five-year window. Size equals real total assets. Collateral is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets. We lag all firm-level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*). 
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On-line Appendix 
Figure A1: Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index  
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Table A1: Correlation matrix  
 Size Wage TFP Debt Liquidity 
Size 1.000     
Wage 0.601 1.000    
TFP 0.125 0.154 1.000   
Debt 0.069 -0.022 -0.082 1.000  
Liquidity -0.086 -0.106 0.016 -0.156 1.000 
 
Notes: The Table shows the correlation matrix among all variables used in the paper. Size equals real total assets. 
Wage equals real total wage bill. TFP is total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method adjusted by GDP deflator.  Debt is short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is current assets less current 
liabilities over total assets.  
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics for exports and sales 
 FEMA=1 FEMA=0 p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exports 336.18 
(1731.93) 
63.39 
(294.84) 
0.000 
Sales 2406.93 
(6867.55) 
781.30 
(2288.96) 
0.000 
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Table A3: Robustness: Alternative definition of productivity 
Panel A: Dependent variable Labor productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = 
Debt 
Finvar = 
Liquid 
Treat*FEMA 0.612*** 0.445*** 0.396*** 
 (3.87) (2.58) (2.73) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.153** 0.467*** 
  (2.01) (2.70) 
Treat*Finvar - 0.063 0.076 
  (0.99) (1.16) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.074 -0.437** 
  (-0.95) (-2.25) 
Finvar - 0.030 -0.096 
  (0.39) (-1.42) 
Size 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (4.95) (4.93) (4.92) 
N 60,995 60,995 60,995 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.143*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 
 (3.63) (2.60) (3.64) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.012*** 0.009*** 
  (2.74) (7.10) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.58) (-0.78) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.028 -0.011*** 
  (-1.38) (-50.06) 
Finvar - 0.003 -0.009** 
  (0.21) (-2.47) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004 
 (4.35) (16.67) (0.78) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 
 (84.36) (109.58) (118.46) 
Size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (8.90) (14.33) (13.98) 
Wage -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-5.89) (-6.87) (-4.54) 
Debt -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001* 
 (-2.53) (-10.53) (-1.79) 
Liquidity 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 (3.16) (2.65) (3.51) 
N 60,912 60,912 60,912 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are labor productivity (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B).  Treat is a dummy 
that equals 1 if the firm raises ECB in the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in 
the post-reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the 
top (bottom) 25% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) of for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Debt 
is calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all 
firm-level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table A4: Robustness: Dynamic productivity estimation 
Panel A: Dependent variable TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Finvar = 
Debt 
Finvar = 
Liquid 
Treat*FEMA 0.090*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 
 (3.06) (3.71) (3.43) 
Treat*FEMA*Finvar - 0.040*** 0.042** 
  (3.05) (2.44) 
Treat*Finvar - -0.008 -0.010 
  (-0.85) (-0.84) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.001 -0.009 
  (-0.01) (-0.88) 
Finvar - -0.109*** -0.208*** 
  (-3.36) (-6.28) 
Size 0.001** 0.001 0.001 
 (2.08) (0.05) (0.93) 
TFP (lag 1) 0.563*** 0.561*** 0.556*** 
 (55.23) (55.15) (54.89) 
N 61,851 61,851 61,851 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable EXP 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA 0.170*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (4.70) (3.03) (3.51) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*FEMA*Finvar - 0.003*** 0.009*** 
  (4.09) (15.57) 𝐓𝐅?̂?*Finvar - 0.006** 0.003*** 
  (2.11) (2.78) 
FEMA*Finvar - -0.008*** -0.014*** 
  (-2.97) (-3.05) 
Finvar - -0.011** -0.016*** 
  (-2.27) (-3.58) 𝐓𝐅?̂? 0.005*** 0.002 0.002*** 
 (3.09) (0.08) (3.20) 
EXP (lag 1) 0.333*** 0.331*** 0.333*** 
 (110.43) (123.93) (123.84) 
Size 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (18.07) (35.89) (5.90) 
Wage -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-7.28) (-7.66) (-3.66) 
Debt -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* 
 (-7.28) (-5.65) (-1.84) 
Liquidity 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003 
 (83.76) (14.42) (0.60) 
N 61,769 61,769 61,769 
Time averages of firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year*State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: All specifications in Panel A are estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator and by dynamic Tobit models introduced by Elsas 
and Florysiak (2015) in Panel B. The dependent variables are TFP (Panel A) and exporting intensity (Panel B). Treat is a dummy that equals 
1 if the firm raises ECB over the period of 1988-2014, and 0 otherwise. FEMA is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation occurs in the post-
reform period of 2000-2014, and 0 otherwise. Finvar is a dummy that equals 1 in a given year for firm i if debt (or liquidity) is in the top 
(bottom) 25% of the distribution of the debt (or liquidity) of for all firms in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Debt is 
calculated as short-term debt to current assets. Liquidity is measured as current assets less current liabilities over total assets. We lag all firm-
level variables by one time-period except for 𝑇ܨ?̂?. Robust t- and z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. In Panel B standard errors are bootstrapped. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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Table A5: Robustness: Estimation of lagged dependent variables 
Dependent variable: EXP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS WG Diff-GMM 
Panel A:    
EXP (lag 1) 0.907*** 0.519*** 0.256** 
 (292.45) (41.29) (2.30) 
N 61,769 61,769 48,052 
Panel B: Finvar = Debt 
EXP (lag 1) 0.907*** 0.519*** 0.412** 
 (283.33) (39.72) (3.47) 
N 61,769 61,769 48,052 
Panel C: Finvar = Liquid 
EXP (lag 1) 0.907*** 0.519*** 0.361*** 
 (290.52) (41.26) (2.90) 
N 61,769 61,769 48,052 
 
Notes: The table presents estimates of lagged dependent variables with robust statistics in parentheses from the exporting 
intensity (EXP) model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Within Groups (WG) and First-Differenced GMM (Diff-GMM). 
 
